Was Marcus Aurelius a Stoic?
No. Marcus Aurelius Was Not a Stoic
One of the great treasures of the surviving ancient Greek literature is a philosophical journal kept by the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius. It is a glimpse into the mind of an extraordinary man, in extraordinary circumstances, doing something extraordinary: philosophical self-counseling. As such, it is also a glimpse into the philosophical thought that was popular at that time. A good indication of what was popular can be found in one of Marcus’ acts as an emperor, to fund teaching in Athens for four philosophical schools: Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and Epicurean. Two other philosophical schools were also active during Marcus’ era, but these schools had few adherents and little in the way of doctrine. These were Pyrrhonism and Cynicism.
At the time, Stoicism was the most influential of all of the schools. For example, Stoicism is the philosophy most discussed by surviving non-Stoic sources, such as Cicero and Plutarch, who somewhat pre-date Marcus. Sextus Empiricus, writing probably slightly after Marcus, even specifies the Stoics to be at that time his chief opponents[1] and for that reason devotes far more ink to critiquing Stoicism than he does to any other philosophy.
Hence, in that era, any serious student of philosophy — which certainly describes Marcus, as even in old age he attended Sextus’ lectures[2] — was dealing with many Stoic ideas. Everybody was. Of the Stoic ideas Marcus chooses to discuss, he approves of most but not all of them. Because of this, there’s a widespread tendency to jump to the conclusion that Marcus was a Stoic, without even considering alternative possibilities.
This is a mistake, as there are strong arguments that Marcus Aurelius was not a Stoic.
The Scholarship on Why Marcus Aurelius Was Not a Stoic
The anthropologist and historian Pierre Vesperini demonstrates that the emperor was not a Stoic in his book Droiture et mélancolie, sur les écrits de Marc-Aurèle. This book is only available in French, but parts of it have been summarized into English.
Vesperini points out that Marcus is engaging in philosophical self-talk. Such a discussion cannot take place without using the concepts of philosophy, even if one does not accept those concepts. For example, Sextus Empiricus uses the concept of the tripartite structure of philosophy — logic, physics, ethics — while also saying that he doesn’t accept that it has these parts.[3] Sextus uses this scheme for his discussion because it is in common use. Similarly, in writing the Meditations, it was unavoidable for Marcus to avoid speaking in terms of Stoic concepts.
As Scott Aikin and Emily McGill-Rutherford put it in Stoicism, Feminism and Autonomy:
The Stoic tradition was not merely a set of academic philosophical doctrines. It was, particularly by the time of the Imperial Stoa, a cognitive paradigm, and one that was the default for intellectuals (Cf. Shaw 1985). Testament to this fact is the phenomenon of contrast by all those who were non-Stoic philosophers in the period. The most important job for a neo-Platonist, Epicurean, or Pyrrhonist is to make it clear where the view on offer critically differs from or overlaps with the prevailing rough set of Stoic views.[4]
Vesperini says that this is the case with Marcus. Consequently, Marcus’ use of the ideas and terminology of a philosophical school should not be equated with being an adherent of that school. Vesperini says this is true even if one is using those ideas and terms in an approving way, finding them therapeutically effective. Remember, the Meditations is a therapeutic exercise that employs philosophical analysis, rather than a work of philosophical analysis. As examples, Vesperini gives that a European might make recourse to “Chinese medicine without feeling like a disciple of Lao-Tseu, to a psychanalyst without knowing anything about Freud’s thought, or to homeopathic remedies without sharing or even knowing Samuel Hahnemann’s philosophy.”[5]
The scholar of Stoicism, Brad Inwood, also discusses why Marcus Aurelius was not a Stoic in Stoicism: A Very Short Introduction, saying:
The emperor was not a professional philosopher and sometimes expresses views that conflict with what we know about the school from other sources. Some scholars even question whether it is right to count him as a Stoic at all; after all, he credits philosophers from others’ schools with inspiring his thought and even refers to Stoics in the third person (Stoics are “they” not “we”).… For Marcus, Stoic philosophy is often held at arm’s length, as it is by many of us.[6]
Inwood here points to the strongest evidence that Marcus was not a Stoic. No place does Marcus ever announce any allegiance to any school of philosophy. While Marcus refers to individual Stoics many times, he speaks of the school just one time, referring to the Stoics as “they.” Here’s what Marcus said:
The natures of things are so covered up from us, that, to many philosophers, and these no mean ones, all things seem uncertain and incomprehensible. The Stoics themselves own it to be very difficult to comprehend any thing certainly. All our Judgments are fallible. Where is the infallible man, who never changes his opinion? Consider the objects of our knowledge; how transitory are they, and how mean![7]
Not only does Marcus distance himself here from the Stoics by referring to them in the third person, he shows not only that he respects the many philosophers who take a position contrary to the Stoics on this issue, but that he sides with them and not the Stoics.
The Stoics thought it was possible to comprehend things with certainty, albeit difficult. Marcus doesn’t agree. Instead, Marcus thinks all our judgments are fallible. He also thinks all our knowledge is transitory. That’s the Pyrrhonist position: what we know is all relative to time, place, and perspective, and all subject to change. This position is directly opposed to that of the Stoics, as one of the fundamental distinguishing principles of ancient Stoicism is the kataleptic impression: that secure, firm, knowledge is possible. Without this principle, the Stoic conception of the sage is not possible, as a distinguishing characteristic of the sage is his infallible katalepsis. The sage is, as Marcus puts it, “the infallible man who never changes his opinion.” He’s not to be found.
Without these key elements of Stoicism, a line of dominoes falls across ancient Stoic theory. If Marcus’ purpose was to set up a critique of Stoic theory, he was starting at one of the classic entry points. Instead, he drops this subject. His purpose isn’t to critique any school of philosophy; it was to apply philosophy to improving his life.
Correspondingly, in the many instances in which Marcus mentions “philosophy” or refers to himself as a “philosopher,” he doesn’t indicate any school allegiance. If he really had a school allegiance — as some claim — why did he avoid referring to Stoicism?
Marcus Isn’t the Only Non-Stoic to Be Called a Stoic
We know of at least one other philosopher from antiquity who was called a Stoic but who denied being one. Seneca tells us in Letters 64.2:
We then had read to us a book by Quintus Sextius the Elder. He is a great man, if you have any confidence in my opinion, and a real Stoic, though he himself denies it.
Why Marcus Does Philosophy
Marcus says that what he gets from philosophy is not happiness, but ideas that help him improve his behavior.
This will repress the desire of vain-glory, that you cannot make the whole of your life, from your youth, appear such as became a philosopher. ’Tis known to many, as well as to your own conscience, that you were far from true wisdom. If this be your aim, you must be full of confusion: It can be no easy matter for you to gain the reputation of a philosopher. Nay, the grand purpose of your life is opposite to this view of reputation. If you know wherein true excellence consists, away with this affair of reputation, and the opinions of others. Be satisfied with this, that what remains of life, be it more or less, be spent as the constitution of your nature requires. Study this point exactly; and be solicitous about nothing else, but knowing what your nature requires, and acting accordingly. You have experienced many wanderings, without finding happiness. ’Tis not found in philosophical arguments, nor in riches, nor in fame, nor in sensuality. Not at all. Where, then, is it to be found? In acting the part which human nature requires. How shall you act thus? By retaining firmly the great maxims from which our desires and actions flow. What maxims? Those concerning good and evil: “that nothing is truly good to a man, which does not make him just, temperate, courageous, and free: and that nothing can be evil to a man, which gives him not the contrary dispositions.”[8]
Marcus presents himself as someone with broad interests in philosophy, and willing to learn from any philosopher. At the beginning of the Meditations, Marcus devotes a section to praising his philosophy teachers. What schools of philosophy these teachers belonged to remains a mystery for many of them because in his praise Marcus never mentions in what school of philosophy they taught, except in the case of Alexander the Platonist, which he appears to have done only to distinguish which Alexander he was referring to. He devotes a lot of praise to his teacher Sextus, the nephew of the Platonist Plutarch. Plutarch wrote extensively against Stoicism, which suggests that it is unlikely for his nephew to have been a Stoic. In any case, Marcus appears to be opening the Meditations by making a point that he has studied widely in philosophy and finds value broadly in it, not just the ideas of any one school.
Cassius Dio, the Roman historian and younger contemporary of Marcus Aurelius, said this about Marcus’ philosophy:
Marcus Antoninus, the philosopher, upon obtaining the throne at the death of Antoninus, his adoptive father, had immediately taken to share his power [with] Lucius Verus, the son of Lucius Commodus. For he was frail in body himself and devoted the greater part of his time to letters. Indeed it is reported that even when he was emperor he showed no shame or hesitation about resorting to a teacher, but became a pupil of Sextus, the Boeotian philosopher, and did not hesitate to attend the lectures of Hermogenes on rhetoric; but he was most inclined to the doctrines of the Stoic school.[9]
Note “most inclined” and “the philosopher.” That’s exactly how Marcus presents himself in the Meditations: a writer with a broad interest in philosophy who is simply most inclined to Stoicism, but who shows no shame or reluctance in seeking out teaching from non-Stoics such as Sextus.
The Weakness of Marcus’ Stoic Inclinations
Marcus’ inclinations towards Stoicism are so weak that he doesn’t make a point of rejecting Epicurean doctrine. While he shows little interest in it, he mentions it at times as being possibly the case, for example, Marcus says:
Either the mind of the whole exerts itself in every particular event: and, if so, accept of what comes immediately from it: or has exerted itself once; and in consequence of this, all things go on since in a necessary series, in which each is connected with the other, [and all together, make up one regular complete whole,] or atoms and indivisible particles are the origin of all things; and, if so, even those have somehow made up one orderly system of the whole. In fine; if there is any God, all things are right and well: or, if there is only a chance, at least you need not act by chance.[10]
Marcus mostly quotes philosophers who are outside the Stoic tradition, such as Empedocles, Plato, Monimus, and Theophrastus. Marcus even quotes those who are profoundly hostile, such as Epicurus.
While Marcus mentions Epictetus, and is clearly strongly influenced by what Epictetus says in his Discourses, Marcus hardly mentions any Stoics. He doesn’t mention Zeno. He mentions Chrysippus just twice. In his correspondence with Fronto he mentions Aristo once, but it’s unclear whether the Aristo he’s referring to is the contemporary of Zeno or some other Aristo. If it’s the one who was Zeno’s contemporary, that Aristo is considered a renegade Stoic, whom Cicero presents as taking a position more similar to that of Pyrrho than that of Zeno.[11]
The individual philosopher who seems to have the biggest influence on Marcus is Heraclitus, whom Marcus mentions five times. Throughout the Meditations, Marcus seems particularly focused on the topic of impermanence — Heraclitus’ most famous doctrine, a doctrine Marcus reminds himself to always remember.[12]
Vesperini says that Pierre Hadot misinterprets the role these philosophers take in Marcus’ thinking. Hadot thinks Marcus embellishes his Stoicism with the thought of other schools of philosophy, that he is open-minded, or perhaps a bit eclectic. Vesperini rejects this explanation” because it applies a modern paradigm to Marcus: “the paradigm of the believer who is open to the faith of others.” This is not the case. Marcus’ allegiance is to philosophy. That’s what he believes in. Stoicism just takes a prominent place in philosophy.
Why It Matters that Marcus Was Not a Stoic
The marketing of modern Stoicism has a problem. While many ancient texts describe Stoicism, a large portion of them come from critics of Stoicism. Only a handful of authors of surviving ancient texts endorse Stoicism, and there are problems with them.
Perhaps the biggest problem is with Seneca. Seneca was a brilliant writer about Stoicism, but his service as a tutor and key counselor to Emperor Nero, one of the most evil and incompetent rulers in history, is a black mark. On top of that, Seneca amassed great wealth in service to Nero, making Seneca’s virtue more than a little suspect. Indeed, later ancient Stoics tended to pretend that Seneca had never existed.
Epictetus is also a problem. While his Discourses and Enchiridion are filled with good philosophical advice, they’re also full of cringe-worthy comments — a fact even admitted at ModernStoicism.com.
Epictetus is routinely pilloried for heartlessness for what he says in Enchiridion 3:
If you kiss your child, or your wife, say that you only kiss things which are human, and thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies.
But he says quite a few other embarrassing things. For example, for modern readers looking to Stoic philosophy as an alternative to religious moral teachings, Epictetus is infuriating because he constantly invokes the gods and often relies on their authority for his arguments. For example, Enchiridion 31:
Be assured that the essential property of piety towards the gods is to form right opinions concerning them, as existing “I and as governing the universe with goodness and justice. And fix yourself in this resolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and willingly follow them in all events, as produced by the most perfect understanding. For thus you will never find fault with the gods, nor accuse them as neglecting you.
On the supposed virtue of temperance displayed by Epictetus, we find in Discourses 2.20 where he says he would torment someone who disagreed with him and “force him to hang himself.” And, as Diogenes Laertius tells us, “Epictetus calls [Epicurus] a preacher of effeminacy and showers abuse on him.”
Worse, Epictetus showered abuse on his own students. In Discourses 3.1 he publicly castigates one of his students whose clothing and hairstyles he did not approve of.
Are you man or woman? “Man.” Adorn yourself then as man, not as woman. Woman is naturally smooth and delicate; and if she has much hair (on her body), she is a monster and is exhibited at Rome among monsters. And in a man it is monstrous not to have hair; and if he has no hair, he is a monster; but if he cuts off his hairs and plucks them out, what shall we do with him? where shall we exhibit him? and under what name shall we show him? “I will exhibit to you a man who chooses to be a woman rather than a man.” What a terrible sight! … Man what fault have you to find with your nature? That it made you a man? … Take away- what is its name?- that which is the cause of the hairs: make yourself a woman in all respects, that we may not be mistaken: do not make one half man, and the other half woman. … Will you not hang yourself? and if women took delight in catamites, would you become one? Is this your business? were you born for this purpose, that dissolute women should delight in you?
So, while Epictetus conveys to us a lot of ancient wisdom, for many people he’s not an attractive character. He’s not a role model that many these days would wish to emulate, as they disapprove of treating other people with Epictetus’ routine insensitivity.
If neither Seneca nor Epictetus can be held up as role models, that leaves the uninspiring Musonius Rufus as the only other Stoic whose works have survived. Remember, Cicero must be excluded, because even though he approved of a lot of Stoic ideas, his loyalty was to Academic Skepticism.
For philosophical and religious movements to catch on, people seem to crave or even need some sort of role model. Where would Buddhism be without Buddha? Epicureanism without Epicurus? Christianity without Christ? Peripateticism without Aristotle?
Sure, Stoicism would still have Zeno and Chrysippus, about whom we have short biographies from Diogenes Laertius, but these biographies are not flattering.
Zeno was sour and of a frowning countenance. He was a cheapskate, even though he was wealthy. Part of his motivation to invent Stoicism seems to be because he got embarrassed that his Cynic teacher made him spill lentil soup on himself in public.
Chrysippus was arrogant and wrote things that were coarse and indecent. He made silly arguments such as “If you never lost something, you still have it. But you never lost horns; ergo you have horns.”
Worse, both of them wrote defenses of incest and cannibalism based on the tenets of Stoic moral philosophy. They’re both unsuitable role models.
That leaves Marcus Aurelius, who must be drafted into the role of Stoic saint — a spokesperson used to market the modern Stoicism brand. Seekers of wisdom are given the bait of Marcus’ search for wisdom, then they’re switched to being sold Stoicism. This is just another bait-and-switch scheme being used to sell Stoicism.
Footnotes:
[1] Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book I, Section 65
[2] Philostratus, Vitae sophistorum ii. 9 (557), also, Suda, Markos
[3] Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book I, Section 13
[4] p 17
[5] p 23
[6] Chapter 2
[7] Meditations, Book V, Section 10
[8] Meditations, Book VII, Section 1
[9] Roman History, Book LXXI, Sections 1–3
[10] Meditations, Book IV, Section 28
[11] On Duties, Book I, Section 6 and De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum Book II, Section 35
[12] Meditations, Book IV, Section 46
